I do not wish to offend those conservatives who are truly progressive, modern, and open to the world.
Tomaševski's statements about his party's possible withdrawal from the ruling coalition came as a surprise to many, yet it was something to be anticipated. Tomaševski ir representing a group of people who are rather isolated from the state and have for the last several decades been insistently told that life is bad for them in Lithuania – that their language is disrespected, their culture is ignored, and their social and economic life purposefully suffocated.
In many respects, Tomaševski's rise to prominence was fuelled by this constant confrontation and tensions built on ethnic mistrust.
The recent tensions between Lithuania and Poland have mobilized Polish-speaking citizens of Vilnius region around the Electoral Action of Poles (LLRA), even though before, many of them were voting liberal or social democratic. Now, all Lithuania's Polish-speaking citizens support the LLRA.
A thaw and the government's liberal decisions regarding national minorities, as well as attempts to reconcile Vilnius and Warsaw, are all beneficial for Lithuania's ethnic minorities. They are not, however, for those leaders who build their political capital on nationalist confrontations.
Tomaševski understands that when the Polish minority is granted their demands, he will lose his platform, support from the electorate, and his chances to get re-elected to the European Parliament.
The wind of change is also blowing within the LLRA itself. Without ethnic confrontations on the outside, the party is very likely to reshuffle its leadership. A more liberal wing of the LLRA might take over. And that means that the party will finally leave its ideological bunker – its constant suspiciousness of the Lithuanian government and accusations stemming from nationalist ideologies.
Even though before this can happen, there are still Tomaševski's supporters in municipal councils to overcome. But in order to fight the backwardness of the region, all efforts should be directed towards economy and not political confrontations.
Moreover, the Russian Union of Lithuania might abandon its close association with the Poles. The Russians should realize the harm that extreme and ultra-conservative demands does to national minorities.
From the point of view of the Polish state, statements made by the LLRA leader are quite indecorous and not at all helpful in solving real problems. In effect, this takes away support for Tomaševski and his positions in Warsaw, making him a spokesman for a small group of radicals only.
But things are more complicated than that – the LLRA radicals do have a backing in Lithuania. They have nurtured extreme conservative opinions among a political group of Lithuanians who follow similarly radical conservatism in their rapport to local Poles. People like Gintaras Songaila and the radical wing of the Homeland Union which shares many opinions with Songaila.
So radicals of the LLRA are discovering their political twins among Lithuanian nationalists with whom they can wage nationalist wars that bring benefit to no one, safe for the groups themselves who can thus remain in their ideological bunkers, completely sealed off from the changing times.
